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Abstract
We analyze the e¤ects of rarity value on the economic and ecological
sustainability of a natural resource. Rarity value means that under
extreme scarcity of the resource unit prots increase explosively. We
focus on equilibrium behavior of very patient agents in a Small Fish
War. In such a setting, agents interacting on a body of water have two
options: they can sh with restraint or without. Fishing with restraint
allows the sh stock to recover; shing without yields higher immediate
but lower future catches.
We make a distinction between weak and strong rarity value. In the
weak variant, equilibrium behavior induces high sustainable sh stocks
and long-run yields. In the strong one, very high equilibrium rewards
may be obtained by almost exhausting the resource, but more moderate
equilibrium rewards are feasible without endangering sustainability.
Keywords: common pool resource games, rarity value
1 Introduction
We analyze strategic interaction in a shery under rarity value (Courchamp
et al. [2006]). Rarity value is a price-scarcity relationship in which unit
prices of a commodity increase sharply as it becomes less and less available.
In the case of a natural resource, this may induce the following scenario.
Once a species becomes rare, its value may increase, this may induce greater
incentives to exploit the resource, leading to even greater rarity, hence a
higher value etc. As a result an Allee e¤ect may occur, i.e., the population
size or density may be pushed below a threshold beyond which only negative
growth rates exist. Courchamp et al. [2006] list an impressive number of
real-world cases showing that rarity value inducing an Anthropogenic Allee
E¤ect (AAE ) is not an armchair-scientists oddity.
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We augment the Small Fish War1 of Joosten [2007] with an AAE and
with a mechanism inducing rarity value. In a Small Fish War, two agents
possess the shing rights to a body of water, and they have essentially two
options, to sh with or without restraint. Restraint in practice may take
various forms, e.g., on catching seasons, on quantities caught, on technolo-
gies, e.g., boats, nets. Essential is that unrestrained shing yields a higher
immediate catch, but continued unrestrained shing may lead to decreasing
future catches; restrained shing by both agents is sustainable.
In a Small Fish War agents wish to maximize their average catches over
an innite time-horizon. In such a setting, a tragedy of the commons is
not inevitable, as Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes can be sustained by subgame
perfect equilibria inducing rather high sh stocks. In a wide range of the
parameter space of the model, the more the catches deteriorate due to over-
shing, the greater the gap between Pareto-e¢ cient and the never restraint
outcomes. Even equilibria which are most harmful sustain stocks well above
never-restraintones. On the other hand, perfect restraintis never Pareto-
e¢ cient in the same parameter range.
Courchamp et al. [2006] disregard several subtleties which we address
here. For instance, the analysis largely relies on considering unit prots and
agents discount the future so heavily that the innite stream of future prots
evaluated at each point in time, is su¢ ciently similar to the prevailing one-
shot situation. Also, the inuence of one agent on the resource and on the
other agents is negligible, but collectively they can really harm the resource
and each other. Moreover, to reach the scarcity region where prices indeed
explode to levels dwarng search costs relatively, a region may have to be
crossed in which prots are very low or even negative. Courchamp et al.
[2006] can not explain how this region is crossed in a consistent manner.
To deal with the subtleties mentioned, we analyze total prots, i.e., unit
prots times quantities, averaged over an innite period by very patient
agents with (possibly) bounded catching capacities in an interactive decision
making framework with both short and long term strategic externalities in
our newly designed Small Fish War. A subtlety discovered while examining
this model was that it is crucial to make a distinction between strong and
weak rarity value, and we propose an operational criterion to separate one
from the other.
Our analysis shows that a Small Fish War under strong rarity value
may very well exhibit the environmental and economic e¤ects sketched by
Courchamp et al. [2006], i.e., no restraint is the Pareto-e¢ cient equilib-
rium, or if that would bring about the AAE; then behavior inducing stocks
just above the Allee threshold is consistent with Pareto-e¢ ciency. It is also
immediate and without contradiction that the agents (may be willing and
1The Great Fish War of Levhari & Mirman [1980] reveals that various regimes of
strategic interaction induce a tragedy of the commons(Hardin [1968]).
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able to) achieve the necessary scarcity levels to exploit strong rarity value.
Contrastingly, weak rarity value leads to almost perfect restraint being
Pareto-e¢ cient equilibria, to high sh stocks and to rewards slightly higher
than perfect restraintrewards. Errors in assessment of the nature of rarity
value may lead to a tragedy of the commons, i.e., deterioration of both the
economic and the resource systems, or to a tragedy of the herdsmen, i.e.,
missed opportunities for the economic system.
Both variants of rarity value leave ample room to serve economic and
ecological goals simultaneously as many equilibria yield sustainable rewards
above perfect restraint. This suggests a basis for e¤ective policies for man-
agement and conservation of natural resources as Holden [1994] attributes
ine¤ectiveness of for instance the common shery policies of the European
community to their biological focus instead of an economic one (see also
e.g., Brooks et al. [2008], BenDor et al. [2008], Sanchirico et al. [2007]).
The immense dangers of strong rarity value can be controlled if the resource
is managed diligently and strictly, e.g., according to the Precautionary Ap-
proach of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (cf., e.g.,
ICES [2005]), and its economic opportunities can be quite considerable.
Next, we review the Small Fish War and then add an Allee e¤ect under
the assumption that unit prots are xed. In Section 3 we examine the
combined e¤ects of rarity value and the Anthropogenic Allee E¤ect. Section
4 concludes with a discussion.
2 Small Fish Wars and impacts of Allee e¤ects
A Small Fish War is played by players A and B at discrete moments in time
called stages. Each player has two actions and each stage players choose an
action independently and simultaneously. We denote the action set of player
A (B) by JA = f0; 1g (= JB) and J  JA  JB: Action 1 for either player
denotes the action without restraint, e.g., catching with ne-mazed net or
catching a high quantity; the other one is the action with a restriction. The
payo¤s at stage t0 2 N of the play depend on the choices of the players
at that stage, and on the relative frequencies with which all actions were
actually chosen until then.
Crucial is the current rate of overshing, i.e., how often the agents have
caught without restraint until then. Let jAt
 
jBt

be the action chosen by
player A (B) at stage t  2, and let q  0: Dene the current rate of
overshing t recursively by
1 =  2 [0; 1] ; and t =
q + t  1
q + t
t 1 +
1
q + t
 
jAt 1 + jBt 1
2
!
: (1)
So,  is the rate of overshing taken at the start of the period analyzed. A
completely untouched system has  = 0; a system where overshing has gone
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on for prolonged periods of time has   1. Parameter q helps to moderate
early e¤ects, as an early decision has a very jumpy e¤ect on the rate of
overshing compared to the same decision later on. Our analysis focuses on
long term horizons for which the values of  and q become irrelevant.
The sh stocks depend on the current rate of overshing t. Let
t  1 + (1 m)

n2
n1   n2 
n1
t  
n1
n1   n2 
n2
t

: (2)
Here, t is the sh stock (normalized to the unit interval), where t = 0
(t = 1) indicates that the sh stock is depleted (at full capacity). The para-
meter m 2 [0; 1] represents the minimal stock due to overexploitation
by the agents, i.e., if steady overexploitation leads to t ! 1; then the sh
stock will be at m: So, (2) determines how the sh stock deteriorates from
its maximum due to shing without restraint. The parameters n1 > n2 > 1
determine the shape of the function connecting the normalized sh stocks to
the rate of overshing. Both n1; n2 are determined by biological and ecolog-
ical features, and one obtains the familiar inverted S-curves for large ranges
of these parameters. The minimal sh stock m depends partly on ecological
factors, but, for the sake of discussion, should be seen as predominantly
depending on technology, and on the relative size of the agents with respect
to the body of water they operate on.
At each stage a bi-matrix game is played, and the choices of the players
at that stage determine their stage payo¤s. Let the stage payo¤s at stage
t 2 N be represented by 
at; at bt; ct
ct; bt dt; dt

. (3)
If player A chooses action 0 and B chooses action 1; As stage payo¤ is bt
and Bs is ct:We assume that shing without restraint yields a higher catch
in any current stage than shing with restraint, hence a < c; b < d. We
assume that two-sided catching without restraint yields higher immediate
payo¤s than catching with restraint, i.e., a < d. The unique stage-game
equilibrium is the strategy pair in which both players use action 1. Observe
that m = 1 yields a standard repeated game.
If both agents never show restraint, then the associated long run stage
payo¤s are dm; if they show perfect restraint, these payo¤s are a: In the
remainder we make assumptions which guarantee that the problem at hand
falls into the category of social dilemmas (see e.g., Komorita & Parks [1996]).
Remark 1 Never restraint gives at most half the long-run stage payo¤s
associated with perfect restraint, i.e., dm  a2 ; the sharpest decline of the
stock occurs for rates of overshing between 0.25 and 0.75.
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2.1 Strategies and rewards
The sets of all strategies for A (B) is denoted by XA (XB): The payo¤ to
player k; k = A;B; at stage t; is stochastic and depends on the strategy-pair
(; ) 2 XA XB; the expected stage payo¤ is denoted by Rkt (; ) :
The players receive an innite stream of stage payo¤s during the play,
and they are assumed to wish to maximize their average rewards. For a given
pair of strategies (; ) ; player ks average reward, k = A;B; is given by
k (; ) = lim infT!1 1T
PT
t=1R
k
t (; ) ;  (; ) 
 
A (; ) ; B (; )

.
First, we focus on rewards from strategies which are pure and jointly conver-
gent. Then, we extend our analysis to obtain larger sets of feasible rewards.
A strategy is pure, if at each stage a pure action is chosen, i.e., an
action is chosen with probability 1: The set of pure strategies for player k
is Pk, and P  PA  PB: The strategy pair (; ) 2 XA  XB is jointly
convergent if and only if z 2 mn exists such that for all " > 0; (i; j) 2 J :
lim supt!1 Pr;
h#fjAu =i and jBu =jj 1utgt   zi+1;j+1  "i = 0;
where mn denotes the set of all nonnegative m  n-matrices such that
the entries add up to 1; Pr; denotes the probability under strategy-pair
(; ). J C denotes the set of jointly-convergent strategy pairs. The set
of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards PJC is then the set of
pairs of rewards each of which can be obtained by using a pair of jointly-
convergent strategies. Under such a pair of strategies, the relative frequency
of action pair (i; j) 2 J converges to a xed number (with probability 1 to
zi+1;j+1 in the terminology of Billingsley [1986, p.274]).
With respect to jointly-convergent strategies, Eq. (2) and the arguments
presented imply that
lim
t!1t = 1 + (1 m)

n2
n1   n2 
n1   n1
n1   n2 
n2

;
where   z22 + 12 (z12 + z21) : So, the expected long-term sh stock con-
verges to a xed number as well, hence the bi-matrices representing the
stage payo¤s in Eq. (3) convergein the long run, too.
To compute the rewards connected to a pair of jointly-convergent strate-
gies is then a matter of simple book keeping. Let
'(z)  lim
t!1t
X
(i;j)2J
zi+1;j+1 (ai+1;j+1; bi+1;j+1) :
Here, (ai+1;j+1; bi+1;j+1) is the entry in Eq. (3) corresponding to action
pair (i; j) 2 J: The interpretation of '(z) is that under jointly-convergent
strategy pair (; ) the relative frequency of action pair (i; j) 2 J being
chosen is zi+1;j+1 and each time this occurs the players receive limt!1 t
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times the associated entry in Eq. (3) in the long run. Hence, the players
receive an average amount of '(z): So,  (; ) = '(z): Figure 1 gives an
illustration of the set of rewards from jointly-convergent strategies.
2.2 Threats and equilibria
The strategy pair (; ) is an equilibrium, if no player can improve by
unilateral deviation. An equilibrium is called subgame perfect if for each
possible state and possible history (even unreached states and histories) the
subsequent play corresponds to an equilibrium, i.e., no player can improve
by deviating unilaterally from then on. In the construction of equilibria
for repeated games, threats play an important role. A threat species
the conditions under which one player will punish the other, as well as the
subsequent measures. More details are given in e.g., Joosten et al. [2003].
We call v =
 
vA; vB

the threat point, where vA = min2XB max2XA
A(; ); and vB = min2XA max2XB B(; ): So, vA is the highest amount
A can get if B tries to minimize his average payo¤s. Under a pair of in-
dividually rational (feasible) rewards each player receives at least the
threat-point reward. We can now present the major result of Joosten [2007].
Theorem 1 Each pair of rewards in the convex hull of all jointly-convergent
pure-strategy rewards giving each player strictly more than the threat-point
reward, can be supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
PE
E'
CP JC \E'
(0.55,0.55)
(3.3,1.925)
(1.925,3.3)
CP JC
P JC
\P JC
PE
(4,4)
(4.23,3.88)
(3.88,4.23)
A's rewards A's rewards
B'
s
re
w
ar
ds
B'
s
re
w
ar
ds
Rewards in a standard FishSmall W ar
v
Figure 1: Here, m = 0:1; n1 = 3; n2 = 2; a = 4; b = 3:5, c = 6, d = 5:5. PE
denotes Pareto e¢ cient rewards. Left: the red area denotes PJC ; the set of
jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards; CPJC is its convex hull. Right:
the blue area E0 represents equilibrium rewards; v  (1:925; 1:925) :
The following consequence of Theorem 1 is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Corollary 2 Let E0 = f(x; y) 2 PJC j (x; y) > vg; then each pair of rewards
in the convex hull of cl E0 can be supported by an equilibrium. Moreover, all
rewards in E0 can be supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Remark 2 We introduce the relative improvement over perfect re-
straint  dened as the total symmetric Pareto-e¢ cient rewards minus
the total perfect restraint rewards relative to the total perfect restraint
rewards. In the example used for Figure 1,
  8:11  8
8
= 0:01375:
Pareto-e¢ cient equilibria yield similar combined improvements, and yield
more than seven times the combined never restraint rewards (0:55; 0:55) :
Furthermore, these equilibria induce play in which both players simultane-
ously show restraint for about 85.6% of the stages; otherwise precisely one
shows restraint.
2.3 A Small Fish War with an Allee e¤ect
We now introduce an Allee e¤ect into the Small Fish War. The following
quote may be found in Berec et al. [2006]: Allee e¤ects occur whenever
tness of an individual in a small or sparse population decreases as the
population size or density declines. Courchamp et al. [2006] explain: Pop-
ulations su¤ering from Allee e¤ects may exhibit negative growth rates at low
densities, which drives them to even lower densities and ultimately to ex-
tinction. Berec et al. [2006] also dene an Allee threshold as the critical
population size or density below which the per capita population growth rate
becomes negative.
Let therefore Th denote an Allee threshold measured in the same dimen-
sion as the sh stock. We formalize the explanations above by
t = 1 + (1 m)

n2
n1   n2 
n1
t  
n1
n1   n2 
n2
t

if s  Th for all s  t;
t  (1  )(t s
0) for all t  s0 if s0 < Th where   1;  2 (0; 1) : (4)
The second part of (4) captures the Allee e¤ect in a rather general manner
implying that the population decreases (at least) exponentially. Hence, if
under strategy pair (; ) the sh stock at any point in time drops below the
Allee threshold, then limt!1 t = 0; we normalize the associated rewards to
 (; ) = (0; 0) and call them Collapse Rewards, since the resource system
as well as the economic system depending on it break down.
Figure 2 visualizes sets of rewards under the Allee e¤ect; without this
e¤ect, PJC would have been pointed in the South-West as in Figure 1.
Equilibrium rewards are quite far removed from the Collapse Rewards. This
means that self-interested rational agents will behave in the interest of the
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Figure 2: PJC (red); CPJC ; PE (green) and E0 (blue) for m = 0:01 and
Th = 0:1, all other parameters remain as in Figure 1. Collapse Rewards are
(0; 0); equilibrium rewards are to the North-East of v  (1:7675; 1:7675) :
environmental system in order to guarantee high sh stocks staying far above
the Allee threshold. Here,   0:011. The Allee threshold inuences the
set of equilibrium rewards only if it is rather high, the set of equilibrium
strategies is obviously reduced for any level of the threshold.
3 Rarity value
The Small Fish War and its extension presented implicitly model a situation
in which agents sell their catches at a competitive market while incurring
xed unit search costs, at least xed with respect to the scarcity of the
resource in their shing environment. Alternatively, if neither prices on
the market, nor search costs are xed, then one can regard the model as
pertaining to a situation in which unit prices go up approximately in the
fashion as the unit search costs do for increasing scarcity.
In some cases, shermen extract less and less in quantities, neverthe-
less obtain higher and higher revenues. An ongoing real-world example
of such an anomaly might be the market for bluen tuna (Thunnus Thyn-
nus). Stocks seem to have decreased by 80 percent in the ve years prior to
2007, and prices have sky-rocketed in 2007 especially in the Far East (e.g.,
Veldkamp [2007]). In economics a range of similar anomalies are known as
Veblen and status goods (cf., e.g., Leibenstein [1950]), but these are hardly
ever linked to exhaustible resources, let alone animal species facing extinc-
tion. Courchamp et al. [2006] model and analyze the latter aspect, and cite
real-world cases in which prices for certain rare animals increase more than
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search costs leading to the extinction of these endangered species.
Figure 3: The unit costs (red), unit prices (black) and unit prots (green)
as functions of the level of the sh stock.
Figure 3 is an adaptation of a poignant gure from Courchamp et al.
[2006]. The unit costs of catching depend on availability, to be captured by
the sh stock  in our model (on the horizontal axis). Unit costs increase
as the species becomes rarer, i.e.,  becomes smaller. Unit prices remain
nearly constant between  = 1 and  = 0:6, but for lower availability of the
sh stock they go up sharply. The formula for the unit prot curve is
 () = p()  c() = 4
3:75

4 + 0:75
1
2

 

12  12+ 1
1:5

: (5)
where p () is the unit price to be obtained on the market and c() is the
unit costs given the (normalized) sh stock : Note that that  (1) = 4 and
that lim#0  () does not exist.2
So, unit prots decrease as sh stocks decrease from maximal level, be-
cause the unit price remains almost constant, but unit search costs increase
steadily. If the sh stock continues to fall below approximately 0:675, unit
prots become negative, i.e., the agents would incur losses by catching sh.
However, if the sh stock would fall below approximately 0:228, then the
unit price driven by scarcity exceeds unit costs again. Moreover, increasing
scarcity causes the unit price to increase more than the unit costs from then
on. According to Courchamp et al. [2006] such a prot-scarcity relationship
spells doom for the survival of the animal species.
2To allow comparison numbers have been scaled, i.e., unit prot is 4 if  = 1:
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Figure 4 illustrates the e¤ects of adding Eq. (5) to the model used for
expository purposes. Since a range with negative unit prots exists, we
nd negative average rewards whereas in the original game all rewards were
positive. For sh stocks with  < 0:228 unit prots increase steadily as sh
stocks decline. The Pareto-dominant rewards are the no-restraintrewards.
Note that the latter rewards are located in the South-West in Figure 1, but
in the North-East in Figure 4. Perfect restraintprovides relatively high
rewards of (4; 4), but belongs to the Pareto-e¢ cient set of jointly-convergent
pure-strategy rewards in neither gure.
Figure 4: PJC for the parameters as before, but with ThAAE = m = 0:1 and
. Matlab generated 250,000 pairs of rewards, unevenly distributed, hence
clusters occur (the heavy lines). In reality, the set is dense. The system
displays strong rarity value as =Base  0:34=0:01375 > 1: Equilibrium
rewards are to the North-Eastof (v; v).
We have the following result pertaining to the threat point v =
 
vA; vB

,
the proof is straightforward, therefore omitted.
Lemma 3 For the model introduced, we have vA; vB  v = mina4 ; b4	 
1
2 (1 +m)

t
 
1
2 (1 +m)

:
Given v  (v; v), the following is trivially valid in view of Theorem 1.
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Corollary 4 Let E0 = f(x; y) 2 PJC j (x; y) > (v; v)g; then each pair of re-
wards in the convex hull of cl E0 can be supported by an equilibrium. More-
over, all rewards in E0 can be supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
The Pareto optimal equilibrium in Figure 4 is no restraintwhich yields
approximately (5:36; 5:36) and induces minimal sh stock. Note that this
implies that   0:34; a 34% relative improvement over perfect restraint.
Clearly, the price e¤ect more than compensates the e¤ect of low catches.
Remark 3 To distinguish weak and strong rarity value, we propose the
following criterion. Let Base be the relative improvement over perfect re-
straint if unit prots were xed at the baselevel, i.e., for maximal availabil-
ity of the resource. Then, we say that the system displays weak rarity value
if =Base  1; and strong rarity value otherwise. Alternatively stated,
the system displays strong rarity value if and only if the symmetric Pareto-
e¢ cient rewards in the model with rarity value exceed those in the model
without. In the model leading up to Figure 4, =Base  0:34=0:01375 > 1:
3.1 Rewards, rarity value and parameter choices
Here, we identify two factors decisive for the sustainability of the resource
system. The rst one is related to the actual harmcaused by persistent
unrestricted catching. The second is that under the evaluation criterion
chosen unit prots are not the real issue, but long-term average total prots.
3.1.1 The inuence of minimal sh stock
In Figure 5, as in the original Small Fish War, Pareto-optimal equilibria
give rewards quite close to and slightly above 4 and a large proportion of
the catches must be restrained. Several equilibrium rewards may be obtained
in two di¤erent ways. One way is to obtain the equilibria by both agents
being fairly modest in the propensity to catch without restraint, the other
is by both agents catching without restraint quite frequently. This can be
seen in Figure 5, as those rewards situated in the beak in Figure 4, have
withdrawn into the body of the sh shape. They are visible as the heavier
lines in the interior of the body. Here, =Base  0:007=0:0121; so this
system displays weak rarity value.
Rarity value e¤ects prevail as in the case related to Figure 4 with the
beakbecoming larger for smaller m. Hence, if the catching capacity in-
creases, the induced unique Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium yields increasing re-
wards. This need not imply exhaustion of the resource, but that the agents
may bring about the lowest possible sh stock deliberately. For m = 0:06;
ThAAE = 0; and all other parameters as before, we found that the Pareto-
e¢ cient equilibrium yields (11:705; 11:705), and =Base  1:926=0:0116
which implies strong rarity value.
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Figure 5: PJC for ThAAE = 0:1; m = 0:12: Here, =Base 
0:007=0:0121 < 1; so this system displays weak rarity value. Again, all
rewards to the North-East of (v; v) can be obtained by an equilibrium.
3.1.2 The inuence of the unit prot function
Unit prots going to innity is not a necessary condition to induce strong
rarity value. This stems from the insight that it is quite arbitrary how
the prot function behaves below the technically feasible minimal sh stock
level, or the Allee threshold for that matter. The system will either not
get there anyway, or the system collapses inducing lower rewards. This
strengthens the result mentioned, in our point of view, as unit prots going
to innity seem quite articial.
We will now show that unit prots going to innity is not su¢ cient to
obtain strong rarity value, either. Now, let the unit prots be given by
0 () = p()  c() = 4
3:75

4 + 0:75
1


 

12  12+ 1
0:5

:
Qualitative features of  and 0 are similar; 0 (1) = 4 and that lim#0 0 ()
does not exist. Unit prots decrease for lower stock levels, become negative
for even lower ones. If however, sh stocks become very low, rarity value
drives unit prots to innity as in the previous case. The most signicant
di¤erence for the analysis is that even if the catching capacities of the sh-
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ermen were unlimited, the price e¤ects do not dominate the quantity e¤ects
su¢ ciently to obtain su¢ ciently high rewards. For m = ThAAE = 0 and 0
we generated a graph qualitatively equivalent to Figure 5 with   0:00067
whereas Base  0:0107: So, for this system displaying weak rarity value,
even highest scarcity is insu¢ cient to obtain rewards inducing e¤ects leading
to the scenario as suggested by Courchamp et al. [2006].
3.2 The Anthropogenic Allee E¤ect
As we have seen in the Small Fish War with constant prices to which an
Allee e¤ect was added, a subset of the jointly-convergent pure-strategy re-
wards is cut o¤. Since Allee e¤ects only occur if the sh stock drops below
a certain threshold, only lower left-hand-side rewards in PJC are a¤ected
there. To visualize this e¤ect, the reader may compare Figures 1 and 2.
However, under rarity value an Allee e¤ect may be expected to cut o¤
rewards in the upper right-hand corner as the rewards associated with no
restraintmove considerably to the North-East.
Figure 6: Here, m = 0:1 and ThAAE = 0:11, other parameters were taken as
before. PJC is cut o¤ in the beak. Here, =Base  0:125=0:01375 > 1:
Equilibrium rewards are to the North-East of (v; v) again.
Indeed, an analysis of the set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards
conrms this intuition. Comparing Figures 6 and 4 reveals that part of the
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beak in Figure 4 has disappeared as anticipated, i.e., the Anthropogenic
Allee E¤ect reduces the set of rewards. Since all rewards to the North-
Eastof (v; v) in Figure 6 are equilibrium rewards, the AAE eliminates a set
of rewards being considerable Pareto-improvements over perfect restraint
compared to the model without AAE.
Note that =Base  0:125=0:01375: So, despite the AAE removing
a set of high-reward equilibria, the Allee threshold is not high enough to
turn strong rarity value into the weak variant. Moreover, a 10% increase
relative to perfect restraint is feasible without reaching the Allee threshold.
Computations show that for ThAAE > 0:1163, the system displays weak
rarity value, i.e., the remainder of the beakdisappears completely.
3.2.1 Hazards and the Precautionary Approach
What is to make of Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium rewards obtained by reaching
the Allee threshold? We treated the Allee threshold as deterministic and
known. There might however, be a stochastic component to such a threshold
if known. Alternatively, the threshold might not be known at all, or it might
have been estimated carefully but still with a stochastic residual. Berec et al.
[2007] claim that Allee e¤ects may work in combinations, hence an external
change may push the system over the threshold.
Furthermore, externalities from other sheries may push the sh stock
targeted downward irrespective of the behavior of the agents. For instance,
Döring et al. [2005] give an overview of negative externalities on own and
other sheries by di¤erent types of gear used in the Baltic Sea. Furthermore,
Kim et al. [2008] build a framework to assess damages by marine sand
mining on sheries in Korea, demonstrating that phenomena completely
unrelated to any shery may a¤ect the sh stock targeted.
These considerations spell doom if the Allee threshold is approached
in the long run. So, there seems to be some wisdom in the Precautionary
Approach of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)
establishing limits on stock levels in order to manage sheries in a safe
way (see ICES [2005]). For this approach two limits are relevant to our
considerations: the biomass limit and the precautionary biomass limit.3 The
former is considered to be a stock level below which the probability of total
breakdown is very high and reproductive capacity is reduced. Two variants
seem to be possible, one is similar to the scenario pictured with respect to
the Allee e¤ect, the second one is similar to the poaching pit (cf., e.g., Bulte
[2003]), in which a ban on shing may not even be su¢ cient to guarantee
recovery and the species may remain vulnerable to extinction (see also Hall
et al. [2008]). The latter limit is a level such that if the stocks should fall
below it, short-term measures to reduce shing should su¢ ce for recovery.
3See e.g., Döring & Egelkraut [2008] and Maroto & Moran [2008] for studies using the
same limits guiding management strategies in sheries.
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4 Conclusion and discussion
The main purpose of this paper was to examine the consequences of rarity
value in a Small Fish War (Joosten [2007]) extensively.4 A second goal
was to incorporate an Allee e¤ect, i.e., once the population size or density of
the resource falls below an Allee threshold, only negative growth rates occur.
Without rarity value, high sustainable yields can only be accomplished if the
agents preserve the resource at stock levels well above minimum. An Allee
e¤ect does not inuence the set of equilibrium rewards unless its threshold is
rather high. So, self-interested rationality and sustainability of the resource
in absence of rarity value may go together very well.
Rarity value brings about a very diverse picture. For instance, we showed
that even if unit prots go to innity under maximum scarcity, it is by no
means guaranteed that the associated rewards constitute even a Pareto-
improvement over the perfect restraint equilibrium. We found it useful
to distinguish strong and weak rarity value, and developed an operational
criterion to separate one from the other. Under weak rarity value, we have
a similar result as in the xed-unit-prots variant: self-interest and sustain-
ability provide no tensions. However, if rewards associated with maximum
scarcity are su¢ ciently high, the economic system and the resource system
have conicting interests. Highest sustainable equilibrium rewards under
strong rarity value can only be accomplished by reaching the lowest possible
sustainable sh stock.
However, equilibrium behavior need not necessarily imply ruthlessness.
Many equilibria induce rewards above the perfect restraintrewards for both
instances of rarity value staying away from the Allee threshold. So, there is
room for compromise between ecological and economic maximalistic goals,
overcoming the one-sidedness of management policies for natural resources
as noted by e.g., Holden [1994], Brooks et al. [2008], thus improving chances
of success cf., e.g., BenDor et al. [2008], Sanchirico et al. [2007].
Our model explains how the agents achieve the necessary scarcity levels
to exploit strong rarity value. Courchamp et al. [2006] assume that they
can, but it remains unclear how the agents do it. For instance, if unit prots
become negative, myopic agents choose restraint, the sh stock recovers
slightly inducing positive prots, and behavior must oscillate from then on
between catching without and with restraint. Su¢ ciently patient agents
may not be deterred by temporarily negative unit prots on their way to
induce the necessary scarcity levels for huge prots due to strong rarity
value. So, this leads to the surprising insight that myopia may be better
than farsightedness for sustainability under strong rarity value.
The following matrix gives an overview of the consequences of the com-
4Rarity value applies to other systems of renewable resources as well (Courchamp et
al. [2006]). An anonymous referee suggested we emphasize this point.
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plex interplay of factors from economics, biology and technology:
m < ThAAE m  ThAAE
=Base > 1
=Base  1
1 # ThAAE 1 = m
1  1 1  1
:
Here, m is the minimal sh stock brought about by prolonged overexploita-
tion of the shery; ThAAE is the threshold of the Anthropogenic Allee E¤ect
(AAE );=Base > 1 (=Base  1) denotes strong (weak) rarity value and
1 is the long-term sh stock under the interplay of the parameters if su¢ -
ciently patient agents strive for Pareto-e¢ cient equilibria. Especially in the
strong rarity value case, such behavior might imply irting with disaster, as
the slightest mistake in actions or estimations of the parameters involved by
the agents, or an unforeseen change in environmental, ecological or climatic
conditions might bring about the AAE. If the agents were to agree upon
managing the resource according to the Precautionary Approach (see e.g.,
ICES 2005), the following overview is appropriate:
m < ThAAE m  ThAAE
=Base > 1
=Base  1
1 = bpl 1 = maxfm; bplg
1  1 1  1
:
Here, we assumed that bpl; the precautionary biomass limit, is rather low,
i.e., bpl << 1; yet su¢ ciently higher than maxfbl; ThAAEg, i.e., higher than
both the biomass limit and the threshold of the AAE. The precautionary
biomass limit is a level such that if the stocks should fall below it, short-term
measures to reduce shing should su¢ ce for recovery.
Rarity value is similar in spirit but unrelated to increasing marginal re-
turns as studied by Maroto & Moran [2008] for instance. The authors show
in a standard model using net present value optimization that increasing
marginal returns and weak dependence of marginal costs on stock induce
collapse of schooling sheries of species with high reproduction rates even if
managed by a very patient single agent (owner). Their arguments work in
two steps. First, they bring to the fore empirical work showing that for sev-
eral schooling species limited dependence of marginal costs on stock levels
exists, cf., e.g., MacCall [1976], Csirke [1989]. Hence, in the case of schooling
sheries marginal returns independent from sh stocks as in e.g., Bjørndal
[1988], might be more justied than boundlessly increasing marginal harvest-
ing costs for decreasing stock levels as analyzed by Gordon [1954]. Then,
they cite several papers giving a rationale for increasing marginal returns
on catching e¤orts due to positive externalities and technological advances,
e.g., Bjørndal & Conrad [1987], Bjørndal et al. [1993], Hanneson [1975],
Sterner [2007]. Maroto and Moran proceed however, with constant unit
prices of harvest and constant variable cost independent from stock levels.
We have a strong intuition that rarity value increases the e¤ects pictured by
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Maroto & Moran [2008]. The ongoing tragedy of the bluen tuna (Thunnus
Thynnus) brings, in all likelihood, together strong rarity value, increasing
marginal returns as tuna is a schooling species, low reproduction rates, and
a multitude of myopic agents (instead of one (or few) very patient owner(s)).
Our analysis allows only qualitative interpretations. We regard the
model in its present state of development as a vehicle of communication to
get across ideas and messages about complex ecological-economical systems.
To enable more tangible conclusions, predictions and recommendations, fu-
ture research should yield quantitative expressions, preferably empirically
established, e.g., on the precise ramications of rarity value, the levels of
the threshold for the AAE, and the (precautionary) biomass limit. The
quality of information matters, as weak rarity value mistaken for a strong
version induces a tragedy of the commons, i.e., resource and exploiters suf-
fer both; a strong version mistaken for a weak one induces a tragedy of the
herdsmen, i.e., the exploiters forfeit considerable income. Classifying rarity
value correctly induces no tragedyfor the weak variant, i.e., resource and
exploiters ourish, and a tragedy of the herdfor the strong one, i.e., the
resource su¤ers. Related, but logically independent, is the issue of imper-
fect information. For instance, if in a system at the cutting edge of weak
and strong rarity value agents wish to achieve a symmetric Pareto-e¢ cient
equilibrium, they must have the right information about the system, and
perfect information regarding the behavior of the other agent(s).
The type of agent that we regard as being modeled, is not the individual
sherman, but rather countries, regions, villages or cooperatives of sher-
men. It is debatable whether the latter types care for the future su¢ ciently
to induce sustainability (see e.g., Ostrom [1990], Ostrom et al. [1994] for op-
timistic views), but individual shermens preferences seem too myopic (cf.,
e.g., Hillis & Wheelan [1994], Bjørndal [1988], Maroto & Moran [2008]). As
we did not invoke an authority, we have not dealt with such an institutions
policies to enhance sustainability. Two intrinsically interrelated research
lines may lead to desirable further developments. One is to examine the
precise role of patience and especially intermediate ranges of patience of the
agents in this complex system, and possibly reinforcing e¤ect of the scarcity
of a resource on the impatience of the agents (as mentioned in e.g., Hillis
& Wheelan [1994]). The other is the positioning of an authority, if options
to deal with the commonsas in e.g., Ostrom [1990], Ostrom et al. [1994]
are lacking, with regard to policy in view of results from the former line of
research.
The number of agents throughout this paper was two, the lowest number
to model strategic interaction. We did not take more agents because com-
plexities in notation and representation arise, hardly justied by an added
value. Figure 7 provides a glimpse of an example of a three-agent Small
Fish War. Nothing in our approach would prevent us from introducing
more agents, but only two- or three agent models can be visualized.
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Figure 7: Rewards obtained by jointly-convergent pure strategies for an
extension of the model underlying Figure 4 to three players.
Another self-imposed limitation was the number of stage-game actions.
For applied work, more levels or dimensions of restraining measures may
be necessary which requires a larger number of actions. For instance, when
considering three types of nets, two types of boats, two options for the du-
ration of shing seasons combined with three levels of quota as measures for
sustainable management of the resource, then 36 actions would be a logi-
cal consequence. In case mixing between certain actions is not possible for
practical reasons, e.g., it is not easy to switch boats easily, a tree structure
in the decisions may be required, yet its subtrees are subject to the present
analysis. Adding actions changes nothing to our approach conceptually. We
refrained from doing so to economize on notations.
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